
Ericsson Security Presentation US TTI event

The state

7 June 2023 Plano, Texas

Mohammad Khaled Director of security solutions






Threat and security landscape

5G Security

Security Culture at Ericsson

Evolving security and threat landscape



Motivations for attacks diversify as networks become embedded in critical functions



Money

controller	_upd : process (CLK_T_RESET_I) is
begin p	
if RES	_I = '1' then asynchronous reset (active hi
cnt	= 0;
state	<= IDLE;
elsif ri	ng_e_geteek_1, thenrising clock edge
stat	<= next_state;
cnt	= next_cnt;
end if;	
end proc	as controller upd:

fb_b(1) <= Ifsr_a(1) xor beta_inv(Ifsr_b(9)) xor Ifsr_b(4) x

controller_comb : process (INIT_I, cnt, state) is begin

Information

mext_ent <= ent

case state is

-- IDLE

Service Disruption

Threat actors often leverage vulnerabilities that are avoidable with sound security measures

- Organized cyber criminals
- Politically-motivated actors
- Hacktivists, e.g., "Anonymous"
- Insiders




Security policy not enforced or monitored



Lack of hardening & insecure configuration of the network

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Operational procedures prone for mistakes



Lack of visibility, control & continuous monitoring

Increased regulatory demands on networks

"Network and information systems and services play a vital role in society. The **existing capabilities are not sufficient** to ensure a high level of security"

EU Parliament

"The **private sector**, as owners and operators of the majority of communications infrastructure, is the **primary entity responsible** for protecting sector infrastructure and assets"

Homeland Security, US

" [5G] will empower a vast array of new and enhanced critical services, from autonomous vehicles and telemedicine, to automated manufacturing and advances to traditional critical infrastructure, such as smart grid electricity distribution. **Given 5G's scope, the stakes for safeguarding these vital networks could not be higher**"

- Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, US



Telecom networks used in new contexts and use-cases changes security requirements

Private cellular networks



Enterprises and organizations deploy 5G and cellular networks to connect factories so that connectivity becomes truly critical and security paramount.

Example of attacks and vulnerabilities

- Misconfigured networks and devices could be exposed through fake base stations, connecting the entire campus to a fake network, potentially shutting down the entire factory.
- Device fingerprinting, figuring out which kinds of devices that are connected to the network, could be achieved without proper configuration of the network.




As new kinds of devices connect to service provider networks, new attack vectors and potential vulnerabilities emerge. The broad range of devices, with varying levels of built-in security, are becoming potential points of breaches.


Example of attacks and vulnerabilities

- Lack of security configuration in IoT devices due to lack of capabilities (weak local encryption, hardcoded passwords, lack of transport encryption are some examples that can be found)
- Lack of operational processes such as continuous update of firmware as new threats emerge or weak back-end security for management of IoT devices

Supply Chain landscape









Threat and security landscape

5G Security

Security culture at Ericsson

5G Diverse network threats





N Contributor/provider of means and/or services

Sources: Ericsson analysis

Secure approach

I NEED TO BUY A DOOR LOCK FOR MY HOUSE

WHAT ARE THE FUNCTIONS OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF LOCKS? WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEADBOLT LOCKS VS MORTISE LOCKS VS KEYLESS LOCKS VS SMART HOME LOCKS?


WHAT ARE THE SECURIY FEATURES I NEED IN MY DOOR LOCK? BUMP RESISTANCE? KEY CONTROL? DRILL RESISTANCE? FORCE RESISTANCE?

Secure products

HOW ARE QUALITY LOCKS MANUFACTURED?


WHAT ARE THE BEST DOOR LOCKS BRANDS? WHY? HOW DO THEY DESIGN THEIR KEYS?

3GPP 5G security standard key features



Secure-by-design

- Ericsson (internal) regulations: 'Ericsson Security Reliability Model (SRM)'
 - Assurance, Compliance & Documentation
- Development activities assure strongest security posture
- Aim \rightarrow to reduce the number of vulnerabilities



Vulnerability management


PSIRT:

Product Security Incident Report Team

- Vulnerability watch
- Incident handling


Vulnerability watch:

• Ericsson PSIRT tracks new 3rd Party Product vulnerabilities



Hardware-rooted in-built security

- Security built into the silicon
- Chain of trust from the hardware all the way to the application layer
- Foundation of all secure operations in the node.
- eFuses to prevent tampering and access
- SRK used to store Ericsson and Operator Keys and credentials
- VC used for Network integration.
- Only Ericsson signed software allowed
 - Prevents manipulation with software and possibility to get hold of keys



NC – Node Credentials (Operator Credentials)

TA – Trust Anchor VC – Vendor Credentials

OTP – One Time Programmable

Security deployment


INSTALL IT RIGHT!

MAKE SURE ALL OF YOUR DOORS HAVE LOCKS.

KEEP THE KEYS WITH YOU!

USE THE HELP OF PROFESSIONAL LOCKSMITHS FOR THE BEST SECURITY!

Secure mobile networks deployment



Security operations

DID I LOCK THE DOOR BEFORE I WENT TO BED? LET ME DOUBLE CHECK!

WHERE ARE MY KEYS?

I LEFT MY DOOR UNLOCKED


YOUR NEIGHBOR IS CALLING: SOMEONE IS TRYING TO OPEN YOUR DOOR, CALL THE POLICE PLZ.

Secure operations

- Secure communication between network management systems and the network Nodes
- Authentication and authorization with possibility of Multi-factor Authentication
 - Certificate-based authentication
 - Role-based Access Control
 - Target-based Access Control
- Security Logging
- Back-up of logs, configuration and SW
- Security training of staff



of breaches involved the Human Element, including Social Attacks, Errors and Misuse.



"The human element continues to drive breaches. This year 82% of breaches involved the human element. Whether it is the Use of stolen credentials, Phishing, Misuse, or simply an Error, people continue to play a very large role in incidents and breaches alike."

Improving network security posture

3GPP networks offer in-built security protections

So, what makes networks vulnerable?

Security policy not enforced or monitored Operational procedures prone to mistakes

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
Limited visibility, control and continuous monitoring



Lack of hardening and insecure network configuration



Intelligent security management



5G deployments require ZTA

Zero Trust Architecture		
NIST SP 800-207	CISA	
Perimeter-less Security	Assume the adversary is already inside the network	
There is no implicit trust granted to an asset based upon ownership, physical location, or network location	Perimeter defenses are no longer sufficient to secure a network, and there should always be an assumption that a threat actor has established a foothold in the network	

Alignment of 5G Security to NIST 7 Tenets of ZTA

T1. All data sources and computing services are considered resources

- •The end-to-end 5G network, including UEs, RAN, Transport, Core, Applications, and Services are assets and data sources
- •In the 5G SBA, NFs are identified as consumers and producers

T2. All communication is secured regardless of network location

- Subscriber identity privacy using SUCI
 TLS to provide confidentiality and integrity protection across the SBI
- •IPsec and DTLS to protect control messaging and user data in transport
- •Full-rate User Plane Integrity protection •Stronger False Base Station (FBS) protection

T5. The operator monitors and measures the integrity and security posture of all owned and associated assets

5G is re-defining security monitoring from physical probes and cables to software and virtual links. New software-based solutions include monitoring of East/West and North/South directions
NWDAF defined in 3GPP TS 29.520 incorporates standard interfaces from the service-based architecture to collect data and evaluate systems in terms of compliance with security policy rules

T3. Access to individual resources is granted on a per-session basis

- •UE access is granted using 5G-AKA, EAP-AKA', and EAP-TLS
- •Authentication and authorization between NFs over SBI in the 5GC is provided with certificatebased mutual authentication using TLS
- •Home Control of authentication is provided for roaming devices
- •RAN Slicing supports slice-specific mutual authentication for devices using the NSSAA

T6. All resource authentication and authorization are dynamic and strictly enforced before access is allowed

- •The SBA uses OAuth 2.0 token-based authorization for any NF that wants to communicate with another NF
- Mutual authentication enables the device to authenticate the network using the AUTH (Authentication Token) returned by the network
 Shared Key using Security Anchor Function (SEAF) and AUthentication Security Function (AUSF).

T7. The operator collects information about the current state of assets, network infrastructure and communications and uses it to improve its security posture


The operator should leverage solutions that align with the continuous diagnostic and mitigation (CDM) systems as defined by NIST in Special Publication 800-207

The operator should have a mature supply chain risk management (SCRM) to ensure 5G network functions to be compliant with GSMA NESAS.


T4. Access to resources is determined by dynamic policy

- •The PCF feeds the AMF with access and mobility policies that affect UE authorization to access 5G network resources
- •Unified 5G policy allows for creating security policies for security use cases and user plane security enforcement within the session management and established security policies

Security features to enable a zero-trust architecture for a secure 5G cloud deployment








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
A pioneer in building secure foundations in the 21st century



Key standardization, certifications and compliance addressed or contributed by Ericsson

3GPP and SA3 Standardization IETF SA3 Technology Long-term **Ericsson strongly and** Working ETSI leadership commitment actively supports both Group **3GPP and GSMA's** initiatives for NESAS ISO/IEC NIST standardization Assurance Standardization Scheme ISO/IEC Fully compliant 27001:2013 with NESAS **GSMA** standards certified

Security Assurance @ Ericsson - Three dimensions of security, working together holistically



Ericsson's range of security capabilities work in tandem to ensure secure and resilient networks.

We **develop** products in a secure way, ensuring security from supply to production and coding. We **deploy** products and solutions securely in customers' networks and in **operations** our embedded features, security management solutions and incident response team maintain security over time.

Key conclusions: 5G Security is National Security







































Industry organizations



Key conclusions

Defense-in-depth

to meet common threats



- •Secure-by-design
- •Ericsson offers in-built security controls on all levels

Network security

depends on operator policy and configuration



- •IPsec/Security Gateways and NW/node configuration
- •Unique users with fewest privileges
- •Staff education

Strengthen safeguards

with intelligent security management



- •Maintained hardening
- •Security policy management
- •Quick discovery and recovery in case of an intrusion or attack



https://www.ericsson.com/en/5g

https://www.ericsson.com/en/security